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FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE COVERT
NARROWING OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PRECEDENT: TIE SUPREME
COURT'S REAL REASON FOR
HEARING SCHIRO V. FARLEY
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994)
I. INTRODUCrION
In Schiro v. Farley,' the Supreme Court denied Thomas Schiro's
claim that his death sentence violated both the Double Jeopardy
Clause and principles of collateral estoppel. Relying on Stroud v.
United States,2 the Court reasoned that because a second sentencing
proceeding is ordinarily constitutional following a retrial, an original
sentencing hearing does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.3
Further, Justice O'Connor stated that Schiro failed to meet his burden
of showing that the issue upon which he desired collateral estoppel
effect had been decided in his favor.4
This Note argues that, although the majority reached the correct
result, the Court's true motivation for granting certiorari was to adjust
the scope of Bullington v. Missouri.5 By ignoring Bullington's focus on
capital sentencing procedure and instead referring to it as a "narrow
exception," Justice O'Connor removed the effective use of Bullington
as precedent without having to explicitly overrule the case. The fact
thatJustice O'Connor could easily have distinguished the two cases on
a factual basis, without adjusting the scope of Bullington, brings this
point to bear.
This Note further argues that, with regard to the issue of collat-
eral estoppel, Justice Stevens' dissent was a misstatement of the law.
The majority correctly focused on the burden of proof detailed in
Ashe v. Swenson6 and rightly found that Schiro failed to meet this
burden.
1 114 S. Ct 783 (1994).
2 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
3 Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789.
4 Id. at 790.
5 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
6 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."7 The
United States Supreme Court has viewed the Clause as having three
distinct purposes: "It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense."8 The Court has determined, how-
ever, that among these concerns, the controlling constitutional princi-
ple is the need to protect against successive prosecutions. 9 In
addressing this issue, the Court has struggled to establish a rule as to
when a sentencing hearing is itself a successive prosecution.10 Implicit
within this quandary is the issue of jury action or inaction on a given
matter, and what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of double jeop-
ardy and collateral estoppel analysis-specifically, when jury silence
on a given charge is tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes.
A. SENTENCING AS A SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION
In Stroud v. United States," the Court held that where a court
grants a new trial due to assignment of error, a defendant may not
claim double jeopardy based upon the imposition of a harsher sen-
tence at retrial.12 Stroud was indicted for first degree murder after
killing a prison guard at Leavenworth, Kansas where he was incarcer-
ated.13 At his first trial, the jury found Stroud guilty and sentenced
him to death.14 After an admission of error by the prosecuting attor-
ney, the court reversed the verdict and sentence, and the State retried
Stroud.15 At his second trial, the jury again found Stroud guilty, but
chose not to impose the death sentence.16 Upon writ of error to the
United States Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of the United
States confessed error and the case was again reversed and re-
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
9 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980).
10 See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981).
11 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
12 Id. at 18.
13 Id. at 16.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 16-17.
16 The jury's verdict read "guilty as charged in the indictment without capital punish-
ment." Id. at 17.
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manded.17 At his third trial, the jury again found Stroud guilty of first
degree murder but made no recommendation as to capital punish-
ment.18 The trial court imposed the death sentence. 19 Stroud ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court claiming a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause based on the jury's decision in the second trial not to
sentence him to death.20
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Jay found no merit in
Stroud's claim.2 ' Justice Jay reasoned that, although the second jury
did indeed provide guilt "without capital punishment," all three of the
convictions established guilt for first degree murder.2 2 Therefore, the
second jury's decision to impose a sentence of life rather than death
was a proper mitigation of punishment but did not reduce the charge
to one of a lesser offense.23 Justice Jay reasoned that Stroud could
not, therefore, argue that the result acted as an acquittal for double
jeopardy purposes.2 4 The Court further provided that the three mul-
tiple trials and convictions did not violate the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause because the earlier trials were reversed based upon
the petitioner's request for a finding of error.2 5
The Court again addressed the issue of sentencing in relation to
the Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v. DiFrancesco.26 The
United States appealed DiFrancesco's sentence, claiming that it was
too lenient in light of the trial court's finding that the defendant fit
the category of a "dangerous special offender."27 The court of appeals
dismissed the Government's claim based on the Double Jeopardy
Clause.28 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that
17 The Court provided: "Such further proceedings be had in said cause, in conformity
with the judgement of this court, as according to right and justice, and the laws of the
United States ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding." Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. Stroud also claimed error based on failure to allow change of venue, refusal of
motion to quash, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Court did not find any of
these arguments compelling. Id. at 18-22.
21 Id. at 17-18.
22 Id. at 17.
23 Id. at 18.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
27 Id. at 123. Under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the United States has
the right, in certain circumstances, to appeal the sentence of those classified as dangerous
special offenders. Here, the Government argued that the district court's decisioh to sen-
tence DiFrancesco to only one additional year of incarceration failed to address the intent
of the Act. Specifically, the district court sentenced the defendant to two 10 year sentences
which would run concurrently with a nine year sentence imposed in an unrelated trial. Id.
at 118-22.
28 Id. at 123.
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the "prohibition against multiple trials is the 'controlling constitu-
tional principle'."29 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun there-
fore concluded that a government appeal of a sentence does not
necessarily offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.30 The Court further
reasoned that, based on principles of common law, courts should not
view the imposition of a sentence with the same finality as an acquit-
tal.31 Justice Blackmun concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause,
itself based upon principles of common law, did not provide defend-
ants any specific right to know their sentence at any specific moment
in time.32 The Court further provided that such a result did not vio-
late the double jeopardy bar against multiple punishment.33 Justice
Blackmun reasoned that if a defendant has not begun to serve the
original sentence, it is constitutional to either lessen or increase it.
3 4
Bullington v. Missouri35 altered the line of decisions represented
by Stroud and DiFrancesco. In Bullington, the Court addressed whether
the reasoning of Stroud applies when a jury makes a sentencing deci-
sion at a second stage where the prosecution has to prove certain ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the jury imposing the death
penalty.36 Under Missouri law, a defendant convicted of first degree
murder receives one of only two possible sentences, death or life im-
prisonment.37 To impose death, the same jury that found the defend-
ant guilty at trial must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence
of aggravating circumstances that warrant the death penalty.
38
29 Id. at 132 (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975)).
30 "[Wlhere a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the
DoubleJeopardy Clause is not offended." Id. (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977)).
31 Id. at 133. At common law, a court could increase the sentence of a defendant so
long as it acted within the same term. Similarly, ajudge in the United States may recall a
defendant to adjust the sentence, provided the defendant has not yet begun to serve that
sentence. Id. at 133-34.
32 "The DoubleJeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know
at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be.
[For example] there is no double jeopardy protection against revocation of probation and
the imposition of imprisonment." Id. at 137.
33 Id. at 138-42.
34 Id. at 139.
35 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
36 Id. at 432.
37 Id.
38 The Court stated:
The hearing must be held before the same jury that found the defendant guilty, and
"additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment" shall
be heard. "Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to
the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible." Thejury must consider whether
the evidence shows that there exist any of the 10 aggravating circumstances or the 7
mitigating circumstances specified by the statute .. . A jury that imposes the death
penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that
912 [Vol. 85
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Bullington was indicted for capital murder after abducting a wo-
man and drowning her.3 9 The jury found the defendant guilty, and
the prosecution sought the death penalty.4 The jury rejected the
prosecution's argument and returned a recommendation of life im-
prisonment.41 Bullington appealed and the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded his conviction. 42 While preparing for
the new trial, the prosecution informed the defendant that it would
again seek the death penalty.43 The defense argued that such prose-
cution would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.44 The trial court
agreed and prohibited the prosecution from seeking the death pen-
alty.45 The prosecution sought a mandamus ruling on the issue from
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District which rejected
the prosecution's argument.46 On appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court, the prosecution successfully argued its case to pursue the death
penalty.47 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.48
Recognizing its earlier holdings in Stroud and DiFrancesco, the
Court distinguished this case by virtue of the sentencing procedure
that Bullington faced under Missouri law.49 Specifically, the Court de-
termined that the jury's limited ability to choose one of only two
sentences, and the trial-like nature of the sentencing hearing, were
significant distinguishing factors.50 The Court reasoned that similarity
it finds beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 433-34.
39 Id. at 435.
40 The prosecution argued the presence of two statutorily recognized aggravating cir-
cumstances: "that '[t]he offense was committed by a person ... who has a substantial
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions', and that '[t]he offense was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.'"
Id. (alterations in original).
41 Id. at 435-36.
42 The appeal was granted based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), which found Missouri's provision allowing women to claim
automatic exemption from jury duty to be a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-





47 The Missouri Supreme Court, in a divided vote, found no violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 437.
48 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
49 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1981).
50 The Court stated:
The jury in this case was not given unbound discretion to select an appropriate pun-
ishment from a wide range authorized by statute. Rather, a separate hearing was re-
quired and was held, and the jury was presented both a choice between two
alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice. Nor did the prosecu-
1995] 913
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to trial was the primary distinguishing characteristic from its previous
cases. 5 1 Although there was a bifurcated process at issue in
DiFrancesco, the Court distinguished it from the process in Bullington
because it allowed for appellate review on appeal of sentence rather
than providing another opportunity to convince a trier of fact to im-
pose a heavier sentence. 52 Thus, the majority reasoned that in ad-
dressing a question of double jeopardy in regards to sentencing, the
key issue is one of procedure.53 Specifically, when the sentencing pro-
cedure forces the prosecution to prove a case beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury's rejection of that case acts as an acquittal as to the
issue argued, just as it would at trial.54 Because Bullington had al-
ready faced a 'trial' on the issue of the death penalty and was acquit-
ted, retrying that issue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.55
Intrinsic within the holding of Bullington is the question of what
constitutes an acquittal for purposes of sentencing. The Court had
already addressed this question in Green v. United States.5 6 Green was
indicted on charges of first and second degree murder.5 7 The jury
returned a verdict of guilty as to second degree murder, but left the
verdict sheet for first degree murder blank.58 On appeal, the court
reversed Green's conviction based on insufficient evidence. 5 9 On re-
mand, Green was again tried for both first and second degree murder,
notwithstanding his plea of former jeopardy as to first degree mur-
der.60 At this second trial, the jury found Green guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced him to death.61 After the court of appeals re-
jected Green's plea of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court granted
tion simply recommend what it felt to be an appropriate punishment. It undertook
the burden of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to
obtain the harsher of the two alternative verdicts. The presentence hearing resem-
bled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on
the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so
precisely defined by the Missouri statutes.
Id. at 438.
51 Id. at 439.
52 Id. at 440.
53 Id. at 441.
54 "By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of
guilt or innocence... Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecu-
tion has 'proved its case.'... A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of
course, absolutely final." Id. at 444-45 (emphasis in original).
55 Id. at 446.
56 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
57 Id. at 185.
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certiorari to address the Double Jeopardy Clause. 62
The Supreme Court held that the first jury's silence on the issue
of first degree murder was tantamount to an acquittal for purposes of
double jeopardy.63 The Court reasoned that Green was in "direct
peril" of being found guilty of first degree murder at his first trial.64
Indeed, prior to the reversal of his conviction for second degree mur-
der, it is undisputed that the state could not have retried Green on
the charge of first degree murder.65 The majority found that the ad-
vent of reversal should not change the implicit acquittal that the ini-
tial jury delivered on that charge. 66 As a result, the Court concluded
that the second prosecution of Green for first degree murder, a
charge on which he had won an acquittal, violated the very essence of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 67
B. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WITHIN THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
In Ashe v. Swenso, 68 the Supreme Court determined that the
Double Jeopardy Clause implicitly contains the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. 69 The state initially tried Ashe for robbing a poker player
named Knight.70 The jury acquitted Ashe due to insufficient evi-
dence.7' Subsequently, the state tried Ashe for robbing Roberts, who
was a member of the same poker group as Knight 7 2 After the court
denied Ashe's motion to dismiss based on the previous acquittal, the
jury found Ashe guilty.73 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri
upheld the conviction, refusing to recognize Ashe's claim of double
jeopardy.7 4 The defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral court.75 Both the United States District Court for the Western
62 352 U.S. 915 (1956).
65 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-93.
64 Id. at 190.
65 Id. at 191.
66 The Court stated:
[Green] was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge [first degree murder] and
the jury refused to convict him. When given the choice between finding him guilty of
either first or second degree murder it chose the latter. In this situation the great
majority of cases in this country have regarded the jury's verdict as an implicit acquit-
tal on the charge of first degree murder.
Id. at 190.
67 Id.
68 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 438.
71 Id. at 439.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 439-40.




District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit denied Ashe's claim of
double jeopardy.7 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 77
The Court reasoned that the question was whether or not the
principles of collateral estoppel are embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against double jeopardy.78 The majority defined
"collateral estoppel" as prohibiting the relitigation of an issue between
the same parties once a valid trier of fact has finally and ultimately
determined the issue.79 Applying this rule to Ashe's case, the majority
found that recharging Ashe for the same crime simply by changing
the identity of the victim violated the principle of collateral estop-
pel.8 0 The Court went on to hold that recharging Ashe similarly vio-
lated the principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and, therefore, it
reasoned that the principle of collateral estoppel was implicit within
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy.8
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of 4 February 1981, Thomas Schiro raped and
killed Laura Luebbehusen in her home.82 At the time of the crime,
Schiro was serving a three year suspended sentence for robbery at the
Second Chance Halfway House in Evansville, Indiana. 83 While at the
halfway house, Schiro worked across the street from Luebbehusen's
home pursuant to a work release program. 84
Earlier that night, around 7:00 p.m., Schiro went to an Alcoholics
76 Both of these courts relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Hoag v. NewJersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958). Id. at 440-41.
77 393 U.S. 1115 (1969).
78 The Court's decision in Hoag did not address this question as it simply posed the
question in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to the advent of Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Id. at 442-43.
79 The Court points out that, although this concept began as an issue of civil law, its
validity in reference to criminal law has long been recognized. Id. at 443.
80 The Court stated that:
Straightforward application of the federal rule [of collateral estoppel] to the present
case can lead to but one conclusion. For the record is utterly devoid of any indication
that the first jury could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not oc-
curred, or that Knight had not been a victim of that robbery. The single rationally
conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one
of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of
law, therefor, would make a second prosecution for the robbery of Roberts wholly
impermissible.
Id. at 445.
81 Id. at 445-46.
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Anonymous Meeting.8 5 Rather than stay for the meeting, however,
Schiro went to a local liquor store and stole some alcohol.8 6 Schiro
took the stolen alcohol to a pornographic movie shop.8 7 After expos-
ing himself to the cashier, he was kicked out of the shop.88 From
there, he went directly to Luebbehusen's home at approximately 9:30
p.m.8 9
Schiro gained entry into Luebbehusen's home by claiming that
his car would not start and asking to use her phone. 90 After pretend-
ing to use the phone, Schiro also asked to use the bathroom.9 1 Simi-
lar to his conduct at the adult movie shop, Schiro exposed himself to
Luebbehusen upon exiting the bathroom. 92 He then told her that
she should not be alarmed because he was gay.93 Schiro further com-
municated that a number of his gay friends had wagered with him that
he would be unable to have intercourse with a woman.9 4 After discuss-
ing homosexuality for awhile, Luebbehusen informed Schiro that she
was a lesbian.9 5
Although Luebbehusen previously had told Schiro that she had
been raped as a child, had never otherwise had intercourse, and had
no interest in having sex with him, Schiro coerced her into engaging
in intercourse. 96 Afterward, Luebbehusen attempted to leave, but
Schiro stopped her, dragged her into the bedroom, and raped her.
9 7
Schiro forced Luebbehusen to consume drugs and alcohol through-
out the evening. 98 When the liquor ran out Schiro took Luebbehusen
to buy more.99 When they returned, Schiro fell asleep, but woke up
when he heard Luebbehusen trying to leave the house.10 0 At this
point, Schiro restrained and raped her again.1 1
Afterward, Schiro felt that he would have to kill Luebbehusen to












96 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 786 (1994).
97 Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (Ind. 1983).
98 Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1992).
99 Id.
100 Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (Ind. 1983).




glass vodka bottle until the bottle broke. 10 3 He then picked up a
metal iron and continued to beat her.1°4 When Luebbehusen re-
sisted, Schiro strangled her to death.'0 5 After Schiro killed her, he
dragged the body into another room and sexually assaulted the
corpse. 106
Luebbehusen's roommate, Darlene Hooper, found the body the
next morning with Luebbehusen's legs spread apart and her pants
pulled down to her ankles.' 07 Blood covered the walls and floors.108
The Hoopers called the police who began an investigation. 10 9 Later,
Dr. Albert Venables, a pathologist, performed an autopsy on the
body. 10 During the autopsy, Dr. Venables discovered lacerations on
the nipples and thighs and a tear in the vagina, all of which he deter-
mined were caused after the victim's death."'
The police later discovered Luebbehusen's car one block away
from the Second Chance Halfway House.112 The police asked the
halfway house's director, Ken Hood, to check the sign-in sheets on the
night of Luebbehusen's death."l3 At this time, Schiro approached a
counselor and stated that he had something he needed to talk
about.114 The counselor referred Schiro to Hood, to whom Schiro
confessed the killing of Luebbehusen." 5 Hood informed the police
of this confession and escorted Schiro to police headquarters. 116
Mary T. Lee, Schiro's girlfriend, later came forward to say that Schiro
had admitted the killing to her shortly after it had happened." 7
Schiro was charged with three counts of murder for the death of
Luebbehusen."18 Count I alleged that he "knowingly" killed Lueb-
behusen." 9 Count II charged him with killing while committing





107 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646, 650 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (Michael Hooper, Darlene's
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ting criminal deviate sexual conduct.' 2 ' The defense argued that
Schiro was either not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally
ill.122 The trial court gave the jury ten possible verdicts, consisting of
the above three counts, lesser included offenses, not guilty by reason
of insanity, guilty but mentally ill, and not guilty.12 3 Thejury returned
a verdict of guilty as to Count H-killing while attempting to commit
rape-and left all of the remaining verdicts blank.'2 4 There was no
explicit culpability requirement as to the killing within this count.12 5
Under Indiana law, the jury could have returned a guilty verdict on
more than one count.'2 6
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution sought the death pen-
alty.12 7 Under Indiana law, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of at least one statutorily recognized aggravating
circumstance. 12 8 Two aggravating factors were particularly relevant to
Schiro's crime: intentional killing in the course of rape, and inten-
tional killing in the course of criminal deviate conduct. 2 9 The de-
fense argued that mitigating circumstances should bar imposition of
death.' 3 0 Based on these factors, the jury unanimously recommended
against the imposition of the death penalty.' 3 ' Acting contrary to this
recommendation, the judge imposed the death penalty upon
Schiro.13
2
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana, Schiro raised
seven errors for appeal.'3 3 Most relevant among these was the ques-
121 Id.
122 Id. (Indiana law permits the alternative verdict of guilty but mentally ill).
123 Id.
124 Id. The verdict sheets relating to the three explicit counts did not provide space or
ask-for a decision as to guilt or innocence on each count. Rather, each count allowed for
only a finding of guilt as to the specific charges within. The jury's only opportunity to
express innocence as to a specific count if it had chosen to return a verdict of guilty on
another count was to leave the sheet in question blank.
125 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) (No. 92-7549).
126 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 787 (1994).
127 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Schiro (No. 92-7549).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 9-10.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 10.
132 Under Indiana law:
If the [death penalty] hearing is by the jury, the jury shall recommend to the court
whether the death penalty should be imposed.... The court shall make the final
determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation, and the
sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to consider.
The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation.
Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ind. 1983) (alterations in original) (quoting IND.
CODE 35-50-2-9).
133 Id. at 1049.
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tion of whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.' 3 4
The court addressed two important sub-questions within this basis of
appeal: first, whether the death penalty procedure under the Indiana
Code places a defendant in doublejeopardy, and second, whether the
imposition of the death penalty in Schiro's case failed to conform ade-
quately to that Code.' 3 5
Schiro argued that the trial court's failure to adhere to the jury's
recommendation against the imposition of death placed him in
double jeopardy 3 6 Citing Bullington v. Missouri,3 7 Schiro claimed
that since the State had the opportunity to argue for the death penalty
in front of a jury, it should not get to relitigate that issue a second
time before the sentencingjudge. l38 The court denied this claim, dis-
tinguishing Schiro's case from Bullington on the grounds that the sen-
tencing procedure did not amount to a retrial since only the judge
could make a final determination of sentence, regardless of the jury's
recommendation.13 9
However, the court ordered the trial judge to make written find-
ings as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that led to the
imposition of death.14 ° Schiro objected to this nunc pro tunc entry141
as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and claimed that it was
inconsistent with the Indiana Code.142 The court denied Schiro's ar-
guments, stating that the nunc pro tunc entry was not a relitigation of
issues, but rather simply a clarification of process.
143
Schiro's arguments did find favor, however, within two dissenting
opinions. Specifically, Justice Prentice observed that the sentencing
judge had no basis by which to find that Schiro had intentionally
killed Luebbehusen, since the count under which he was convicted
contained no express level of required culpability.14 4 He went on to
state that this lack of explicit mens rea meant the jury could have con-
134 See Id.
'35 Id. at 1053.
136 Id. at 1054.
137 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (after the initial trial and sentence to life in prison were over-
turned, the Court determined that, under the DoubleJeopardy Clause, the State could not
seek death penalty a second time after guilt was found at retrial).
138 Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ind. 1983).
139 Id. at 1055.
140 Under Indiana's death penalty statute, trial judges must lay out their written findings
for imposing a sentence of death. The Supreme Court of Indiana felt that this was not
properly done in this case and ordered the trial judge to make a nunc pro tunc entry ex-
plaining his rational for sentencing Schiro to death. Id. at 1056.
141 The entry specified that the trial judge had found no mitigating circumstances and
had determined that Schiro was guilty of intentionally killing while committing rape.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1057.
144 Id. at 1068 (Prentice, J, dissenting).
[Vol. 85
DISCRETE NARROWING OF BULLINGTON
victed Schiro for killing intentionally, knowingly, or accidently. 45 Jus-
tice Prentice claimed that there was no way that the trial judge could
have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Schiro was guilty of
'intentional' murder for sentencing purposes. 146 Justice DeBruler
shared this view, concluding that the nunc pro tunc entry provided no
explicit formula explaining how the trial judge reached his final deter-
mination as to the culpability for killing.147
Following the United States Supreme Court's denial of certio-
rari,14 Schiro sought post-conviction relief in the Indiana Supreme
Court on the grounds that the trial judge was biased, the judge im-
properly considered Schiro's behavior during trial, and Schiro re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel. 149 The court rejected Schiro's
claim that the trial judge based his sentence solely on his behavior,
pointing to the trial judge's proper finding of the aggravating circum-
stance of killing while committing rape.150 The court also quickly dis-
missed Schiro's claim of ineffective counsel.151 Justice DeBruler again
dissented, agreeing with the defendant's assertion that the trial judge
considered Schiro's behavior without allowing for the opportunity to
respond to such observations. 152 The United States Supreme Court
again denied Schiro's writ of certorari.153
Schiro then instituted a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. 54 The district
judge remanded back to state court to allow Schiro to exhaust all state
remedies prior to federal habeas corpus proceedings. 55 Schiro raised
four bases of appeal including issues of resjudicata, ineffective repre-
sentation, accumulated error, and foreclosure.' 56 The Supreme
Court of Indiana quickly disposed of the first three claims. 157 As to
the issue of foreclosure, Schiro claimed that since the jury's conviction
145 Id. (Prentice, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Prentice, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1067-68 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
148 Schiro v. Indiana, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983). This was the first of three certiorari denials
this case would receive prior to the Court granting certiorari in 1993.
149 Schiro v. State, 479 N.E.2d 556, 558 (Ind. 1985).
150 Schiro claimed that the trial judge sentenced him based on observations that Schiro
was continuously rocking while in the jury's view, but would halt such activity whenever the
jury was absent. The trial judge does indeed refer to this rocking motion within his nun
pro tune entry regarding his decision to impose death, however, read in context, this com-
ment is presented to demonstrate the absence of any mitigating factors. Id. at 559.
151 Id. at 561.
152 Id. at 562 (DeBrulerJ., dissenting).
153 Schiro v. Indiana, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986).
154 Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 1989).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1203-08.
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for felony murder lacked the element of intent, the aggravating cir-
cumstance of "intentional" killing could not be considered in the pen-
alty phase.'-5  The Supreme Court of Indiana disagreed, reasoning
that because felony murder is not a lesser included offense of inten-
tional murder, the issue of intent had not been foreclosed regardless
of the jury's failure to confront that issue.159 Justice DeBruler dis-
agreed with this analysis in the dissent, stating that the jury's failure to
return a guilty verdict on Count I-"knowingly" killing-acts as an
implicit acquittal on the issue of intent, a higher level of culpability.1 60
The Supreme Court again denied Schiro's writ of certiorari.16'
The Court's denial contained a rare separate written concurrence
from Justice Stevens. 162 Justice Stevens began by pointing out that a
denial of a writ of certiorari is not meant to be construed as an affirm-
ance of a lower court's decision.' 63 Indeed, such denial "expresses no
opinion on the merits of the case."' 64 Justice Stevens chose to com-
ment on the merits, however, based upon the troubling aspects of this
particular case.' 65 Recognizing that the issues had yet to be addressed
in federal court, Justice Stevens observed that Indiana's ruling on the
issue of double jeopardy should not detract from the important fed-
eral dimension that such a question posed.' 66 Specifically, he drew
attention to the fact that although Indiana's ruling fails to regard si-
lence as to Count I as an acquittal on the issue of intent, such a deci-
sion may not determine the constitutional collateral estoppel aspects
of that issue.' 67
After the third denial of certiorari, Schiro once again raised is-
sues of double jeopardy and foreclosure in federal district court. 68
Schiro's double jeopardy claim rested on the Indiana Supreme
Court's order for a nunc pro tunc entry and on the trial judge's deci-
sion to ignore the jury's recommendation against imposition of the
158 Id. at 1207.
159 Id. at 1208.
160 Justice DeBruler felt that the prosecution had three opportunities upon which to
argue the issue of intent: before the jury at trial, before the jury at the sentencing hearing,
and before the judge after the jury's recommendation against death. Only in the last of
these cases did the prosecution succeed. The failure to convince the jury, however, should
have foreclosed the issue of intent altogether. Id. at 1209.
161 Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910 (1989).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring).
167 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). This view was a precursor to justice Stevens' dissent in
Schiro v. Farley four years later.
168 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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death penalty.' 69 Citing to United States v. Cosentino,170 the district
court determined that the new entry did not violate double jeopardy
since it was based entirely on evidence already in the record.' 71 The
district court further relied on the Supreme Court's decision to allow
a new sentencing hearing in Hitchcock v. Dugger,172 determining that if
a new hearing can be held, the Supreme Court of Indiana may at least
demand a more explicit statement from the sentencing judge. 173 As
to the trial judge's decision to reject the jury's recommendation, the
district court determined that the Indiana Supreme Court had rightly
and properly decided the constitutionality of the procedure in earlier
proceedings. 174 On the issue of foreclosure, the district court cited to
Michigan v. Long,175 stating that the question of whether or not there
is an acquittal is largely a matter for state law.' 76 As a result, the court
found no constitutional merit to Schiro's argument of foreclosure. 177
Schiro appealed to the Seventh Circuit, again raising his claim of
double jeopardy. 78 Following the reasoning of the district court, the
Seventh Circuit reinforced that the decision as to what constitutes an
acquittal is largely a matter for state law and had already been deter-
mined contrary to Schiro's claim.179 Citing to Ashe v. Swenson,'80 the
Seventh Circuit went on to address the collateral estoppel argument
raised by Justice Stevens in denial of certiorari.' 8 ' Based on this pre-
cedent, the court concluded that Schiro had not adequately demon-
strated that the jury verdict actually and necessarily determined the
issue he sought to foreclose.' 8 2
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari' 8 3 to determine
whether the imposition of the death penalty on Schiro was a violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause or collateral estoppel or both.'8
169 Id. at 651-53.
170 869 F.2d 301, 309 (7th Cir. 1989).
'71 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646, 651 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
172 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
173 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
174 Id. at 653-54.
175 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
176 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646, 660 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
177 Id.
178 Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992).
179 Id. at 970.
180 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
181 Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962, 970 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992).
182 Id.




IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor185 the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision refusing to vacate Thomas Schiro's
death sentence.' 8 6 Relying on Stroud v. United States,187 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that because a second sentencing proceeding is
ordinarily constitutional following a retrial, an original sentencing
hearing does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.188 The Court
further rejected Schiro's claim that his death sentence violated the
constitutional principles of collateral estoppel.18 9 Specifically, Justice
O'Connor stated that Schiro failed to meet his burden of showing that
the issue upon which he desired foreclosure had been decided in his
favor.' 90
Justice O'Connor began by addressing the State's claim that to
grant relief to Schiro would be contrary to the holding of Teague v.
Lane.191 Recognizing that the State failed to address this issue in its
brief, Justice O'Connor declined to address the State's concern.' 92
Reasoning that a State may waive the Teague bar, Justice O'Connor
referred to the State's silence on the issue as "significant."193 While
the Supreme Court could have addressed the Teague argument on its
own, Justice O'Connor declined to do so.194
Next, Justice O'Connor addressed Schiro's argument that his
death sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 95 Citing United
States v. DiFrancesco,'96 the Court recognized that the controlling con-
stitutional principle of the Clause is to prevent subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 197 Schiro urged that the court should treat
his sentencing phase as a subsequent prosecution. Following the prin-
ciples of Stroud, Justice O'Connor declined to recognize Schiro's
claim,198 declaring that if a second sentencing proceeding is generally
185 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg
joined Justice O'Connor.
186 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
187 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
188 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789 (1994).
189 Id. at 790-92.
190 Id. at 790.
191 Id. at 788; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (barring retroactive application of
new rules to federal habeas corpus cases).
192 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 788-89 (1994).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 789.
195 Id.
196 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
197 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. CL 783, 789 (1994).
198 Id.
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not violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause, a first sentencing hearing
certainly cannot be such a violation.19 9 In support of this proposition,
Justice O'Connor further reasoned that according to North Carolina v.
Pearce,200 a second sentencing hearing was allowable if the first was
improperly based on evidence of prior crimes which ought to have
been deemed inadmissible for sentencing purposes.201 Further,
Schiro's argument that he had to relitigate the issue of intent was in
and of itself unpersuasive.2 02 Indeed, Justice O'Connor found that
since a larger amount of relitigation of past crimes takes place in sen-
tencing based on previous conduct, Schiro's argument lacked
merit 2 03
Justice O'Connor went on to state that the Court's previous deci-
sion in Bullington v. Missour 04 was not to the contrary.20 5 Interpret-
ing Bullington, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court did not
find an absolute prohibition against harsher sentencing at retrial.20 6
Rather, the majority reasoned that the finding in Bullington provided a
"narrow exception" because the capital sentencing scheme at issue
was manifestly different from previous questions of double jeopardy
that the Court had addressed.20 7 Justice O'Connor found that the
facts of Schiro's case were markedly distinguishable.208 Since no sec-
ond capital sentencing hearing ever took place, the majority reasoned
that Schiro's case did not implicate the Bullington prohibition.20 9 In-
deed, Justice O'Connor found that the State conducted only one trial
and one capital sentencing procedure as part of its "one fair opportu-
nity" to prosecute a defendant 2 10
The Court went on to dismiss Schiro's claim that collateral estop-
pel should act to vacate his death sentence.2 1' Relying on Ashe v.
Swenson,212 Justice O'Connor reasoned that to demonstrate issue pre-
clusion defendants must show that an issue or fact has been validly
199 Id.
200 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
201 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789 (1994).
202 Id. at 789-90.
203 Id.
204 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (holding that a harsher sentence may not be assigned on retrial
even though the earlier conviction was overturned altogether).






211 Id. at 790-92.
212 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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and finally decided in their favor.213 Schiro's claim that the jury's fail-
ure to return a verdict on Count I-"knowingly" killing-should act as
an acquittal failed to satisfy this burden.214 Justice O'Connor pro-
vided that although the Indiana Supreme Court had already decided
the question of whether the jury's failure to return a verdict as to
Count I signified an acquittal, the preclusive effect of the jury's action
provided a federal question that the Court had to address.2 15
Justice O'Connor reasoned that under the principles of Ashe, the
Court first had to consider whether the jury in Schiro's case could
have rationally grounded its verdict on an issue other than intent 216
To determine the answer, the Court took into account the record of
the entire proceeding, placing the burden on the defendant to
demonstrate conclusively that an issue had been foreclosed.2 17 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that because the jury instructions were ambigu-
ous, the jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than
Schiro's intent to kill.218 Specifically, the majority referred to the fact
that the jury was not instructed nor expected to return verdicts as to
every count.219 Justice O'Connor also pointed to evidence that may
have led the jury to believe that it could only return a verdict on one
count.220 Notably, closing arguments for both the defense and the
prosecution implied that this was what the jury ought to do.221 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that although the jury instructions allowed for
the return of more than one verdict, there was no way to conclusively
determine whether the jury understood this in light of the implica-
tions from closing argument.222
Justice O'Connor further determined that the jury instructions as
to the question of intent were ambiguous, regardless of Schiro's claim
that intent was not necessary to a finding of guilt for Count 11.223 Rely-
ing on the trial record, the majority pointed to the fact that the trial
judge instructed the jury that the State had to prove intent for both
murder and felony murder.224 Justice O'Connor reasoned that as a
result of such instructions by the judge, the jury could rationally have
believed that it was required to find knowing or intentional killing
213 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 790 (1994).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 790-91.
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before returning a verdict of guilty on any of the three counts. 225
The majority further provided that the evidence from trial indi-
cated that the issue of intent was not significant in the trying of the
case.226 Justice O'Connor stated that Schiro's defense counsel never
raised the argument that the jury ought to find Schiro not guilty as to
the first count because of the issue of intent.227 Further, even at the
sentencing hearing, the defense never addressed the issue of intent,
but rather attempted only to provide mitigating factors that the judge
and jury should consider in weighing the appropriate sentence to
impose.228
The majority did acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, a
jury's silence is an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy.229 Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned, however, that for collateral estoppel to have
effect in such circumstances, the burden of showing that an issue has
been "actually and necessarily" determined lies with the defendant.230
Because the Court determined that the jury instructions at the initial
trial were ambiguous and could have been interpreted to mean that
the jury could only return one verdict, the threshold test for raising a
question of collateral estoppel could not be met.23 '
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent,23 2 would vacate Schiro's death
sentence based on collateral estoppel.233 Justice Stevens reasoned
that because the jury was twice offered the ability to find intent, but
declined to do so both times, the opportunity for the trial judge to
sentence based on an aggravating circumstance which required intent
ought to have been foreclosed.234 Indeed, Justice Stevens made the
even stronger claim that the majority opinion violated the very es-
sence of the Double Jeopardy Clause.235
Justice Stevens argued that, even though the majority opinion
centered on the gruesome facts of Schiro's crime, it is for precisely
that reason that the issue of foreclosure ought to have weighed in






231 Id. at 790-92.
232 Justice Blackmun, who also wrote a separate dissent, joined Justice Stevens' dissent.
233 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 794 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Schiro's favor.236 Specifically, Justice Stevens reasoned that such a
horrific crime should tend to increase a jury's tendency towards im-
posing death.237 The jury's failure to find Schiro guilty of intentional
murder and its refusal to recommend the death sentence were there-
fore, according to Justice Stevens, indicative of its resolve on the issue
of intent.238 The dissent further argued that there were more than
adequate grounds upon which the jury could have reached this con-
clusion. 23 9 Indeed, even though no one at trial disputed that Schiro
was responsible for causing Luebbehusen's death, the defense raised
the issue of intent by calling into question Schiro's mental condi-
tion.240 Specifically, Justice Stevens found compelling evidence that
showed Schiro's addiction to drugs and alcohol, prior mental
problems, and a love interest in a mannequin.241
Justice Stevens further argued that, despite the majority's conten-
tion, a close inspection of the verdict forms presented no issue of am-
biguity.242 The dissent reasoned that since each of the ten forms
contained a space for the jury to check if it agreed with that specific
instruction, the only way to record disagreement was to leave a partic-
ular form blank.243 Following the precedent of Green v. United
States,244 Justice Stevens argued that silence as to a particular count in
combination with a return of guilty as to another count is an acquittal
of the former count.245 Justice Stevens reasoned that such a result
ought to have foreclosed the issue of intent for sentencing pur-
poses.246 As a result, Justice Stevens concluded that the trial judge
236 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244 335 U.S. 184 (1957).
245 Justice Stevens specifically stated that: "the jury's silence on two counts should be
treated no differently, for doublejeopardy purposes, than if the jury had returned a verdict
that expressly read: 'We find the defendant not guilty of intentional murder but guilty of
felony murder.'" Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 795 (1994).
246 Stevens quoted language from Indiana Supreme CourtJustice DeBruler's dissent:
At the trial, the prosecution used every resource at its disposal to persuade the jury
that appellant had a knowing state of mind when he killed his victim. It failed to do
so. At the sentencing hearing before the jury it had an opportunity to persuade the
jury that appellant had an intentional state of mind when he killed his victim. The
jury returned a recommendation of no death. At the sentencing hearing before the
judge, the prosecution had yet another opportunity to demonstrate an intentional
state of mind, and finally succeeded. In my view, the silent verdict of the jury on
Count I, charging a knowing state of mind, must be deemed the constitutional
equivalent of a final and immutable rejection of the State's claim that appellant de-
serves to die because he had an intentional state of mind. That verdict acquitted ap-
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improperly based Schiro's death sentence on an issue the jury had
already rejected, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 47
The second portion of Justice Stevens' dissent provided direct
criticism of the majority's reasoning.2 48 Specifically, the dissent at-
tacked the majority's assertion that the jury may not have resolved the
issue of intent in Schiro's favor by addressing Schiro's confession, the
jury instructions, and the jury's belief on whether or not it could re-
turn multiple verdicts.249 Justice Stevens reasoned that even though
the confession could have been sufficient to find intent, there was no
indication from the record as a whole that it was sufficient.2 50 As for
the jury instructions, Justice Stevens argued that, as most naturally
read, they did not support a finding of ambiguity.2 5 1 Lastly, Justice
Stevens argued that the majority's finding that the jury might have
believed it could return only one verdict was tenuous at best.2 52 Spe-
cifically, he pointed to the fact that the instructions to the jury fore-
man provided that such foreman "must sign and date the verdict(s) to
which you all agree." 5 In addition, Justice Stevens argued that the
majority's reliance on innocuous statements by the prosecution and
defense in closing arguments was no basis by which to uphold a death
sentence.2 54
Justice Stevens concluded by pointing out that once the jury
found Schiro guilty of felony murder, the State would certainly not
have been able to reprosecute Count I, regardless of whether the jury
left the form blank or actually indicated acquittal.255 The dissent rea-
soned, therefore, that as to Count I, the jury's inaction was an implicit
acquittal on the issue of intent. Therefore, according to Justice Ste-
vens, the trial judge's decision to sentence Schiro based on an issue of
intent violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.2
5 6
pellant of that condition which was necessary to impose the death penalty under this
charge.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 Specifically, there were two separate instructions, one for knowing or intentional
killing in Count I, and a separate, non-intent instruction related to felony murder. The
specific jury instructions to which Justice Stevens referred were No. 8 as to Count I and No.
4 as to felony murder in Counts II and III. Justice Stevens further pointed out that not
once during any time when the Supreme Court of Indiana addressed this case did the
parties raise an issue of ambiguity. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
255 Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT
Justice Blackmun dissented to express his view that Bullington v.
Missouri25 7 provided a basis by which the Court should vacate Schiro's
death sentence.2 58 Under Bullington, courts cannot force defendants
to face the possibility of death at a subsequent sentencing hearing if
they had been acquitted of capital punishment at an earlier sentenc-
ing procedure.259 Justice Blackmun argued that the sentencing proce-
dure in Schiro's case was nearly identical to the procedure in
Bullington.260 Because of the "trial-like" approach of the sentencing
hearing, defendants must feel themselves in jeopardy when the jury
returns to give its recommended sentence.2 61 Justice Blackmun con-
tended that this possibility of peril ought to prevent the trial judge
from overturning the recommendation against death, especially
when, as in Schiro's situation, the decision conflicts with the jury's
implied acquittal of Count I-knowingly killing.262
IV. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the real reason for the Supreme Court's
granting of certiorari was to narrow the scope of Bullington v. Mis-
souri.2 63 By refusing to apply the holding of Bullington to Schiro's case,
the Court implicitly adjusted the focus that had been placed on proce-
dure without explicitly stating such a result. Justice O'Connor could
have easily distinguished the two cases on purely factual grounds. In-
stead, however, Justice O'Connor chose to refer to Bullington as a "nar-
row exception" and ignore its focus on procedure.264 This resulted in
the Court's reaching the correct decision in Schiro for ill thought out
reasons.
This Note further argues that Justice Stevens' dissent misstated
the law of collateral estoppel. The-majority correctly placed the bur-
den of proof on the defendant under the precedent of Ashe v. Swen-
son, and Justice Stevens' own arguments indicate the correctness of
the majority's result.
257 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
258 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 792-93 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 793 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
264 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 790 (1994).
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A. BULLi-NGTON VERSUS SCHIRO: DISTINGUISHING FACT VERSUS
PROCEDURE
Justice O'Connor summarily rejected Schiro's claim that BuUing-
ton ought to control by stating that the two cases were "manifestly dif-
ferent"265 A close look at the two cases, however, suggests that this
distinction is not immediately obvious. Indeed, the sentencing proce-
dure outlined in BuUington is nearly identical to that presented in
Schiro. Specifically, both cases dealt with a bifurcated process2 66 in
which the prosecution had to prove aggravating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt to allow for the imposition of the death
penalty.
Justice O'Connor appears to recognize the special nature of this
process in Bullington, but fails to recognize the procedural similarity to
Schiro. Justice O'Connor's language in Schiro bears this out:
In Bullington we recognized the general rule that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a har-
sher sentence at retrial." Nonetheless, we recognized a narrow exception
to this general principle because the capital sentencing scheme at issue
"differ[ed] significantly from those employed in any of the Court's cases
where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to
sentencing."2 67
The trial-like nature of the sentencing process which Bullington faced
in Missouri is almost identical to the punishment phase that Schiro
faced in Indiana. Both men faced either death or life in prison. In
both cases, the prosecution had to show the existence of aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Both cases allowed the de-
fense to show mitigating circumstances to negate the effect of the
prosecution's arguments. And both cases required the trier of fact to
make written findings explaining its decision.
There were, of course, some procedural differences between the
two cases. However, these differences seemingly only add weight to
Schiro's claim of doublejeopardy. Specifically, under Missouri law, in
Bullington, the jury was the final trier of fact. In Schiro, however, under
Indiana law, the jury recommended sentence in full view of the de-
fendant, but the final trier of fact was the sentencing judge. There-
fore, while Bullington addressed the issue of a bifurcated process,
Schiro, for all intents and purposes, addressed a trifurcated process. In
other words, not only did Schiro face the same two tiered procedure
as Bullington, he had to run the gantlet a third time as well. Such a
265 Id.
266 A bifurcated trial is a "[tirial of issues separately, e.g., guilt and punishment ... in
criminal trial." BLAcK's LAw DiCIONARY 163 (6th ed. 1990).
267 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 790 (1994) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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process gives the prosecution vast leeway in approaching argument
and proving the aggravating circumstance and issue of intent neces-
sary to impose death. Specifically, as Justice Blackmun pointed out in
his dissent, the prosecution argued its case at trial before the jury, at
sentencing before the jury, and at sentencing before the judge.
As an issue of procedure, the cases are certainly not "manifestly dif-
ferent" asJustice O'Connor argued. Quite the opposite, as a question
of procedure the two cases are, if anything, manifestly similar. The simi-
larity between the two cases breaks down only when the surrounding
facts are compared. Specifically, Bullington argued double jeopardy
in relation to a second sentencing hearing, while Schiro raised that
same issue in regards to a first sentencing hearing. This difference is
the basis by which Justice O'Connor distinguished the two cases. Why
then did she insist on referring to Bullington as a "narrow exception"?
There are two possible explanations. First, and most unlikely, is
thatJustice O'Connor simply did not recognize the need to differenti-
ate between a procedural comparison and a factual one. Justice
O'Connor's own language, however, makes this explanation suspect.
Specifically, after laying out the procedural elements of the sentenc-
ing process in Bullington as a "narrow exception," she subsequently
stated that this case did not implicate "the Bullington prohibition
against a second capital sentencing proceeding." 268 Thus, Justice
O'Connor saw the factual versus procedural difference but chose not
to make it. The second possible explanation is thatJustice O'Connor
intentionally ignored the difference between procedure and fact in an
attempt to reduce the scope of Bullington. This argument is more
compelling.
A vastly different Court decided Bullington thirteen years prior to
Schiro. The vote in Bullington was a bare majority of five justices while
the other fourjoined in dissent. Interestingly, of the five in the major-
ity, only two justices remained on the Court in 1994: Justice Black-
mun, the 1981 author, and Justice Stevens. Their dissents in Schiro,
especially justice Blackmun's, bear outJustice O'Connor's true moti-
vation in referring to Bullington as a "narrow exception." Justice
O'Connor changed the scope of Bullington's precedent by misapply-
ing it rather than openly adjusting it. As a result, Bullington, for all
intents and purposes, has lost its proper focus on sentencing proce-
dure and has become instead an anomaly in the Supreme Court's his-
tory of double jeopardy cases.
Justice O'Connor has likely succeeded in creating a "narrow ex-
ception" where none previously existed. Even more troubling, such a
268 Id.
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result was not necessary to the proper determination of Schiro. Bull-
ington and Schiro are distinguishable based upon purely factual cir-
cumstances. Justice O'Connor's recognition of this makes her
reference to Bullington's procedure as a "narrow exception" a covert
operation to eliminate with prejudice what was the focus of a narrowly
decided case thirteen years ago.
B. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND INTENT: JUSTICE STEVENS'
MISAPPLICATION
Justice Stevens' dissenting argument that Schiro's death sentence
should be overturned under collateral estoppel principles is a clear
misstatement of prior case law. Specifically, Justice Stevens' attempt
to apply the doctrine of implied acquittal from Green v. United States269
ignored important distinguishing factors that make Green inapplicable
to Schiro's case. As a result, the majority correctly relied on the bur-
den of proof standard defined in Ashe v. Swenson in declining to ad-
dress Schiro's collateral estoppel claim.
Justice Stevens argued that the issue of intent was foreclosed for
sentencing purposes based on the jury's silence as to Count I-"know-
ing" murder:
After a full trial, the jury was given the opportunity to find Schiro guilty
on each of three counts of murder, on just two of those counts, or on
just one. As in the similar situation in Green v. United States, the jury's
silence on two counts should be treated no differently, for double jeop-
ardy purposes, than if the jury had expressly read: 'We find the defend-
ant not guilty of intentional murder but guilty of felony murder."270
Even allowing for the truth of this statement, the result urged byJus-
tice Stevens is not inevitable. Specifically, because felony murder is
not a lesser included offense of intentional murder, the jury's failure
to return a verdict on Count I expresses no opinion on the relevant
issue of mens rea for Count II. Indeed, the jury could have found guilt
under Count II, applying the culpability standards of intent, knowing,
or reckless. There is no basis, however, to argue under which of these
standards the jury reached its conclusion of guilt.
Justice Stevens argued, however, that the failure of the jury to
return a guilty verdict on Count I indicated its opinion on the issue of
intent. Because the jury had the option to return more than one
count of guilt, he concluded that the failure to return a verdict of
guilty on Count I could only have related to proof of intent: "The
only rational explanation for such a verdict is a failure of proof on the
issue of intent-a failure that should have precluded relitigation of
269 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
270 Id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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that issue at sentencing."271
This conclusion is simply incorrect. Jury dynamics are anything
but straightforward, and indeed many "rational explanations" exist
that could explain the jury's decision without necessarily foreclosing
the issue of intent. As Professor Paul H. Robinson points out:
Juries commonly do not understand the instructions that they are given.
If they do understand the instructions, they frequently are unable to re-
member them or apply them during jury deliberations. Even if they are
able to apply them, they sometimes will not apply them if they do not
agree with them. 272
Numerous studies bear out the complications inevitable in jury dy-
namics. Of significance to Schiro's case, one study showed that only
65.8% of instructed jurors remembered that intent was a necessary
element of first degree murder, instead of simply finding that the de-
fendant caused the death in question. 273
Schiro's case was more complicated than most. The jury had ten
different verdict sheets which contained three separate counts, lesser
included offenses, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty but mentally
ill, and not guilty. Most lawyers would have difficulty separating out
the elements that distinctly apply to each verdict sheet, thus, it is evi-
dent that twelve lay persons would encounter many problems. The
most probable scenario in Schiro is that the jury simply acted as ra-
tional human beings, attempting to combine justice with time man-
agement. Specifically, the jury likely quit deliberating after they
reached agreement on a charge that accurately described what hap-
pened. It should come as no surprise that the jury would have de-
cided on Count II. Count II provided that Schiro killed while
committing rape. By finding guilt on that charge, the jury returned
the most detailed verdict possible while avoiding a debate about terms
such as "intent" in Count I and "criminal deviate conduct" in Count
III. The fact that all three of these counts provided for the same pen-
alty would have made the jury's decision to stop deliberating even
easier.
Further, if, as Justice Stevens argued, the jury knew it could re-
turn more than one count and had decided against the issue of intent,
the jury would have also returned a guilty verdict on the lesser in-
cluded offense of either second degree murder or manslaughter
along with Count II. Since the jury did not, Justice Stevens' argument
271 Id. (Stevens. J., dissenting).
272 Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant7, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 159, 170 (1994).
273 Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MiCH. J.L. REF.
401, 420 (1990).
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fails its own test of logic. The more compelling argument is that ajury
will simply take the easiest road to agreement. Specifically, if the jury
could quickly find Schiro guilty of Count II, it may not have thought it
necessary to proceed, especially since that charge most accurately de-
scribed the events that took place on the night of the killing.
Allowing for this possibility, along with many others, the majority
acted correctly in refusing to address Schiro's claim of collateral estop-
pel. As long as the possibility that intent had not been foreclosed re-
mained, Schiro failed to establish his threshold burden. The
requirements of Ashe v. Swenson clearly state that the burden falls on
defendants to "actually and necessarily" show that an issue has been
decided in their favor. The fact that felony murder is not a lesser
included offense of Count I impedes Schiro's ability to do this, and
provides clear distinction from Green.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court held that Thomas Schiro's
death sentence did not violate either the Double Jeopardy Clause or
implicit principles of collateral estoppel. While this is the correct re-
sult, the Court reached its conclusion through the misapplication of
precedent. This result has the potential to significantly redefine the
Supreme Court's line of double jeopardy cases. Specifically, Justice
O'Connor, by referring to Bullington's focus on procedure as a "nar-
row exception," attempted to change the precedential value of a nar-
rowly decided, thirteen-year-old case. The majority ignored the fact
that it could have distinguished Bullington and Schiro on purely factual
grounds and altered Bullington to create a "narrow exception" where
none previously existed. How lower courts will interpret this refer-
ence remains to be seen; however, it is certain that such a discrete
attempt at narrowing will only confuse the proper focus of Bullington
on procedure.
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